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SUMMARY 
 
“Slips of the tongue” of Japanese cabinet ministers have attracted the attention of 
scholars. But, focusing mainly on the backgrounds of these slips, the scholars have not 
paid sufficient attention to the outcomes. The present paper is an attempt at empirical 
identification of the political outcomes of such slips of the tongue. We distinguishs two 
levels of outcomes: the personal level and the government or party level. At the 
personal level, acknowledgment of individual responsibility is the most important of the 
outcomes. The ministers in question have to bear responsibility for their verbal missteps 
in one of three ways: resignation, apology or explanation. If they have to resign from 
the ministerial posts, they will never be appointed again to the post of a minister. 
Nevertheless, most of them will be successful in holding their seats in the Diet even 
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after the slips of the tongue. At the government or party level, there are three major 
outcomes, two or all of which frequently occur simultaneously. First, slips of the tongue 
may cause a split in the diplomatic relations of Japan with other countries. Secondly, 
they may threaten the stability of a coalition government. Thirdly, they may be used as a 
means of attack against the government or government party by the opposition parties. 
It seems that the main objective of such an attack against the government or ruling party 
is to achieve support expansion and vote acquisition for the opposition(s). But, the 
examination of the results of national elections does not give us any definitive 
conclusion about whether these objectives are attained or not. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Speeches of Japanese Diet members or cabinet ministers sometimes become a domestic 
and/or a diplomatic issue and are problematized by the press and the Diet. That is what 
we call a “slip of the tongue.” The following examples are fresh in our memory:  
 
Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori’s remarks “Japan is a divine nation centering on the 
Emperor” (The Japan Times, May 17, 2000) and “I hope undecided voters will remain 
uninterested in the election and sleep through it” (cited in The Japan Times, June 26, 2000); 
 
Chairman of the Financial Reconstruction Commission, Michio Ochi’s “Please inform us 
of any complaints about the inspection, if it's severe ... I will give it the utmost consideration.” 
(The Japan Times, February 24, 2000);  
 
“[The] Diet should consider the fact Japan may be better off if it armed itself with nuclear 
weapons” (The Japan Times, October 20, 1999) by Shingo Nishimura, Parliamentary Vice 
Minister of the Defense Agency.  
 
The ministers in question sometimes have to resign from the ministerial 
positions bearing the responsibility for their remarks. 
“Slip of the tongue” or “verbal misstep” can be defined very broadly as a 
politician’s remark which becomes a political problem or which negatively affects the 
politician. The remark in question is usually a public or official one, but, as in Ochi’s 
case cited above, it may be an informal or off-the-record one. In this paper, however, we 
will focus upon verbal missteps of Japanese cabinet ministers, and limit our 
examination to the cases where the ministers in question bear political responsibility for 
their verbal missteps by resigning, apologizing, or offering explanations. Here it is 
worthy of note that a cabinet minister is expected to respect the Japanese Constitution 
and the official view of the Japanese Government. If a minister betrays that expectation 
in his speech, therefore, it may become a slip of the tongue. 
Kawano (2001) gives the following answer to the question ‘what are political 
factors constituting slips of the tongue of a minister?’ There are three conditions. First, 
the speech of a minister falls into one of the four categories: (1) it justifies Japan’s 
military activities in the Sino-Japanese War and in the Pacific War, (2) casts doubt upon 
the necessity of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, (3) comments favorably on the 
nuclear armament of Japan, or (4) discriminates against Asian people or minorities in 
the United States. Secondly, the speech becomes a domestic and/or a diplomatic 
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problem. Thirdly, the speech is picked up and problematized by the press. If these 
conditions are met, the speech of a minister is considered a slip of the tongue and the 
minister has to bear political responsibility for it.  
A cabinet minister who commits a slip of the tongue bears responsibility for it 
personally. But the political outcome of a slip of the tongue is not limited to this. 
Besides the personal responsibility of the individual ministers in question, which we call 
the political outcome at the personal level, there are other important political effects at 
the level of the government or the political parties. A slip of the tongue may cause 
diplomatic problems between Japan and other countries. Or it may cause instability in 
the coalition government. Finally, the opposition parties usually take advantage of these 
slips of the tongue and use them as a “means of attack” against the governing party or 
parties. This is also a political outcomes of a slip of the tongue. Why do the opposition 
parties use such slips by ministers as means of attack? Support expansion and vote 
acquisition for the opposition parties will be plausible answers. Thus, this paper 
attempts to show whether these two objectives of support expansion and vote 
acquisition are achieved or not. To see this, it examines the results of national elections, 
especially the relative rates of votes (hereafter “rate of vote” or “vote rate”) and the 
number of elected persons, of the House of Representatives.  
So far this kind of study has been considerably neglected. Little attention has 
been paid to the relation between ministers’ slips of the tongue and the opposition 
parties’ responses to them. The present paper seeks to contribute to the better 
understanding of language used by politicians by empirically analyzing the effects of 
slips of the tongue. 
In the next section, Section 2, we will briefly examine the previous studies on 
the slips of the tongue of the Japanese ministers, and show that most of them do not 
explore the actual outcomes. Accordingly, in the following sections, Sections 3 and 4, 
we will discuss the actual effects of the slips of the tongue. For the sake of convenience 
of discussion, we will distinguish two levels of outcomes: personal and 
government/party levels. In Section 3, we will examine the forms of personal 
responsibility of the ministers in question, including their subsequent political career 
and the personal results in the national elections. In Section 4, we will discuss three of 
what we call government/party outcomes: diplomatic problems, instability of coalition 
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governments, and the oppositions’ attack and its effect. The present paper is concluded 
by a summary of what outcomes slips of the tongue of ministers bring about. 
 
2 Brief sketches of previous studies 
 
Slips of the tongue by cabinet ministers have been a repeated phenomena in the 
post-war Japan, as is shown in Table 1. Despite their frequency, Japanese political 
scientists have not paid much attention to verbal missteps of the ministers. It is true that 
a few textbooks of Japanese political history mention slips of the tongue of the 
ministers1). The mentions are, however, only an enumeration of historical events at best. 
They never try to scrutinize political outcomes of the slips of the tongue. In addition, the 
vast majority of historical research concerning Japan’s war responsibilities treat slips of 
the tongue in a similar vein 2). Although research of Japan’s war responsibilities pays 
much attention to Japanese politicians ’ remarks on Japan’s military activities in the 
Sino-Japanese War (1931-1945) and in the Pacific War (1941-1945), the remarks are 
touched upon or cited only as illustrations of deplorable or dangerous cases which 
represent their (wrong) historical interpretations, political beliefs and political thoughts. 
In sum, scholars have paid little attention to the political outcomes of ministers’ slips of 
the tongue. 
There are a few books and articles which deal directly with verbal missteps of 
Japanese politicians. Because they were discussed already (Kawano 2001: 19-21), this 
essay looks only at those aspects directly related to the political effects of slips of the 
tongue. Yoshibumi Wakamiya’s Sengo Hoshu no Ajia Kan (Japanese Conservative’s 
View of Asia in Post-war Japan) clarifies the view of Japanese conservative politicians 
toward Asian countries and peoples, by an analysis of slips of the tongue. Wakamiya 
examines political beliefs and political thoughts of politicians who made slips of the 
tongue. On the basis of this study, Wakamiya argues that the historical view of the 
Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War which regards them as wars to liberate Asian 
countries from Western powers is typical of the view of conservative Japanese 
politicians toward Asian countries and peoples. 
In analyzing slips of the tongue, Ofer Feldman employs the distinction between 
Honne (the honest feeling) and Tatemae (the obverse), which he regards as one unique 
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characteristic of the political culture of Japan (Feldman 1996 and Feldman 1998). Both 
Wakamiya and Feldman clarify the background for the slips of the tongue. But, neither 
discusses their political outcomes. 
The preceding review of literature may not be exhaustive. Some more works 
may be regarded as dealing with slips of the tongue 3), and there are many more studies 
of political language in general than those which explicitly discuss slips of the tongue4). 
But one thing is clear. We have shown that the previous research has paid little attention 
to the political outcomes of ministers’ slips of the tongue. Though it focuses upon slips 
of the tongue, the present paper does not aim to explore their background, including 
political thought or political belief. Instead, it focuses upon major political outcomes of 
the minister’s speech that is called slip of the tongue. It is true, in political science, slips 
of the tongue have not been a major research theme, but it is by no means an unworthy 
study area, as their political outcomes will show.  
 
3 Political outcomes at an individual level 
 
This and the next sections will discuss political outcomes of slips of the tongue. Ideally, 
details of each case of the slips of the tongue should be introduced and examined, but it 
is impossible to dwell upon all the cases of slips of the tongue. Therefore, the details of 
each slips of tongue are given in Table 1. 
Political outcomes of slips of the tongue will be conveniently discussed at two 
levels: personal level and governmental/party level. This section will examine political 
outcomes of slips of the tongue at the personal level. Primarily, it will focus on political 
responsibilities of the ministers who themselves bear personal responsibility for their 
slips of the tongue. We will try to identify their personal political responsibilities in 
terms of their major career development after their verbal missteps and in terms of the 
results of general elections. First, we will examine their subsequent career after the slip 
of the tongue. 
Table 2 shows the main career of the ministers who bore the most serious 
political responsibility, that is, resignation from their ministerial posts. The table shows 
their personal records in the Cabinet, the Diet and the party after their verbal missteps. 
Their career in Table 2 are taken mainly from the handbook edited by Miyagawa 5), but 
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other references 6) are used in order not to miss any career positions. From Table 2, we 
can see the personal political responsibilities of the ministers in question.  
First, they have never been again appointed to the post of a minister after the 
slips of the tongue.  
Second, they have not been reappointed to an important post in the Diet or in 
the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) such as chairman of the Committee on 
Budget of the House of Representatives and the Secretary-General of the LDP.  
The former is perhaps the most important personal political outcome of a slip 
of the tongue. But this is true only of the ministers who lost their ministerial positions 
because of their slips of the tongue. If the ministers can escape resignation for their slips 
of the tongue, then they may be re-appointed to a ministerial post. Ryutaro Hashimoto, 
Minister of International Trade and Industry, made a slip of the tongue in 1994 and had 
to explain his real intention, but he did not resign and was elected as Prime Minister in 
January 1996 (see Table 1). And this responsibility of a slip of the tongue contrasts 
sharply with that of the other kind of scandal. Ministers who step down from their 
ministerial positions because of other scandals have an opportunity to be reappointed to 
a ministerial post. For instance, Kiichi Miyazawa, who was the Vice-Prime Minister and  
the Finance Minister, resigned from the posts because of the Recruit Co. bribery scandal 
in December 1988, but he was appointed to Prime Minister in 1991. And Ryutaro 
Hashimoto, Minister of Finance, resigned from the post owing to a series of securities 
and banking scandals in 1991, but he was selected as Prime Minister in 1996.  
Let us now consider the results of elections, to see whether or how much the 
ministers in question bear responsibility to the electorate for their slips of the tongue. 
Table 3 shows that most of the ministers were reelected as members of the Diet after the 
slips of the tongue. As far as the election was concerned, slips of the tongue had no 
negative effect upon their career as Diet members. It may be because the slips of the 
tongue become hardly the point at issue in the electoral district of the ministers 
concerned (Yamada 2000: 258). We can observe that the slip of the tongue leads to the 
resignation from the cabinet post, but not to the loss of a seat in the Diet. In other words, 
political responsibility for the slip of the tongue at the personal level is a responsibility 
as a cabinet minister but not as a Diet member. 
However, there are two exceptions. One is the case of Shingo Nishimura, who 
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was Parliamentary Vice Defense Minister when he made his slip of the tongue. Table 3 
shows a sharp decline in his vote rate before his verbal misstep and after it. Although 
this result may be viewed as the reflection of the voters’ critical attitudes toward his 
remark on nuclear armament of Japan, a further investigation will be required to 
confirm it. 
The other is the case of Michio Ochi. He made a slip of the tongue when he 
was Chairman of the Financial Reconstruction Commission. He was defeated in the 
42nd election in the single-member electoral district, though, in the previous election on 
October 20, 1996, he had been elected in the proportional district, but not in the small 
district. His rate of votes declined slightly from 26.2% in 1996 to 22.2% in 2000. His 
slip of the tongue may have negatively influenced the voters. 
Our brief examination of the results of the elections shows that most of the 
ministers who made verbal missteps were reelected. It does not seem that, as far as the 
elections are concerned, the slips of the tongue affect them negatively. But this 
conclusion is not definitive at present because we have not taken important factors into 
consideration. For example, we should consider such factors as the time lag between the 
slip of the tongue and the election, the character of their constituencies 7), and the 
contents of the slip of the tongue. 
 
4 Political outcomes of governmental/party level 
 
There are three important political outcomes at this level. They are: a split in the 
diplomatic relations between Japan and the countries concerned; destabilization of the 
foundation of coalition government; a “means of attack” against the Government parties 
by the oppositions. Actually, these outcomes are often related to each other, and brought 
about simultaneously. But we will discuss them separately in this order. 
 
4.1 Diplomatic issue  
The slips of the tongue may cause a split in the diplomatic relations between Japan and 
the countries concerned. For instance, China or South Korea makes a strong formal 
protest against speeches of the ministers that justify Japan’s military activities during 
the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War. An example is a speech by Takami Eto, 
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Director of the Management and Coordination Agency. He said in 1995 that “the 
Japanese colonial rule over the peninsula in the period of 1919-1945 had some positive 
impacts”(The Japan Times, November 9, 1995). The Government parties attempted to 
send Foreign Minister Yohei Kono to South Korea to explain the Government’s official 
view (Mainichi Shimbun, November 11, 1995). On November 11, 1995, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of South Korea made a formal protest against Eto’s speech and 
requested Japanese Government parties to appropriately solve Eto’s issue. In addition to 
this protest, the South Korean Government refused to accept the proposal of Kono’s 
visit to South Korea. It was clear that South Korea demanded Eto’s discharge from the 
ministerial position. Finally, on the 13th of the same month, Eto stepped down from his 
ministerial position facing these strong protests. The cases of Shigeto Nagano, Minister 
of Justice, and Shin Sakurai, Director General of the Environment, are similar ones. 
Moreover, they also threatened the stability of the coalition government and incurred 
attacks from the opposition parties. 
A different kind of slips of the tongue may also incur a split in a 
diplomatic relations with foreign countries. The speech which discriminates 
against minorities in the United States was strongly criticized by the 
American public. Seiroku Kajiyama, Minister of Justice, said “it’s like in 
America when neighborhoods become mixed because blacks move in, and 
whites are forced out” (The Japan Times, January 21, 1992). The Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution 
demanding Justice Minister Seiroku Kajiyama be reprimanded for his 
remark. Kajiyama had to resign 8).  
 
4.2 Coalition disruption 
The second political effect at this level is the destabilization of the foundation of 
coalition government. The example is Keisuke Nakanishi, Director General of the 
Defense Agency, who cast doubt upon the necessity of Article 9. Nakanishi’s 
resignation was demanded by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP, now Social Democratic 
Party (SDP)), one of the major parties of the coalition government at the time. The 
coalition government feared that it might incur the disruption of the foundation of the 
coalition because the JSP strongly opposes any revision of the Constitution. (Yomiuri 
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Shimbun, December 3, 1993) For this reason, the coalition government decided upon 
Nakanishi’s resignation. Cases of Shin Sakurai, Takami Eto and Shigeto Nagano also 
brought about similar results (see Table 1). 
 
4.3 A means of attack by the opposition 
Slips of the tongue can also be a “means of attack” against the government and  
government parties by the opposition. The “attack” primarily means both verbal 
criticism of the government and interruption in the discussion of committees or sessions 
in the Diet. 
The criticism and the interruption are political outcomes themselves. But we 
can safely assume that support expansion and vote acquisition are real objectives of 
such attacks by the opposition parties. Therefore, we will try to find whether these 
objectives are attained or not. This requires an examination of the results of various 
national elections. 
There are many examples where slips of the tongue by ministers are utilized as 
a means of attack by the opposition parties, as is shown in Table 1. The opposition 
stages a boycott of Diet sessions, demands the resignation of the minister concerned, 
demand the political responsibility of the prime minister who has appointed the minister, 
or charges that the prime minister lacks qualifications. Through such tactics, they seek 
to shake the government. In fact, slips of the tongue of ministers have provided the 
opposition with many such opportunities. Here we will take up just one case, that of 
Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori’s slip of the tongue, “Japan is a divine nation centering on 
the Emperor” in May 2000. On 17 May, four major opposition parties, the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ), the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Liberal Party (LP) and 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP), agreed to form an united front in a bid to jointly 
force Mori out of office. They charged that Mori lacked the qualifications to be prime 
minister. They also demanded Mori’s resignation through Diet deliberations and debate 
sessions (The Japan Times, May 18, 2000). Under such a severe attack, Mori held a 
press conference for the explanation of his remark on May 26. He apologized for having 
caused a misunderstanding with his remark, but he refused to withdraw it (The Japan 
Times, May 27, 2000). Not satisfied with Mori’s apology, the opposition parties 
strengthened the attack against the coalition government. Opinion polls showed a sharp 
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decline in public support for the cabinet (for example, Asahi Shimbun, May 30, 2000).  
Now, it remains to be seen whether support expansion and vote acquisition 
aimed at by the opposition are actually attained or not. For this purpose, we will 
examine the results of national elections, especially the rates of votes and the number of 
elected persons, of the House of Representatives.  
Researchers of political language usually take up a particular speech employed 
by politicians, including slips of the tongue, and infer a particular political effect from it. 
But they have never attempted an empirical validation of alleged political effects 
(Matsuo 1987: 181, Kawano 2000: 41). In what follows, we will try to see whether we 
can empirically identify the political effects of slips of the tongue in terms of the results 
of elections.  
Certainly, as long as elections are concerned, there are several methods for 
demonstrating the effect of slips of the tongue. For instance, the methods of an exit poll, 
a questionnaire or an interview with voters might be effective at the time of a national 
election. They will help to clarify whether voters are influenced or not by slips of the 
tongue. But such methods cannot be applied to the past cases of political speech in 
general and slips of the tongue in particular. Therefore, we will focus upon the change 
of vote rates and the number of winners. 
We will make three comparisons of the rates of votes and the number of elected 
persons of major political parties in consecutive general elections before and after slips 
of the tongue. First, the results of two national elections－the 38th election on July 6, 
1986 and the 39th election on February 18, 1990－will be compared. Between these 
two elections, there were slips of the tongue by such ministers as Masayuki Fujio and 
Seisuke Okuno 9). As is shown in Table 4, in the 39th general election, three opposition 
parties, Komeito, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Japanese Communist 
Party (JCP) decreased in the vote rates and lost approximately ten seats in the House of 
Representatives. Among the opposition parties, the JSP alone raised its vote rate from 
17.2% to 24.4% and won 136 seats, an increase of 53 seats. In sum, the opposition 
parties as a whole raised the vote rate by 1% and the number of winners by 8 seats. In 
contrast, the LDP decreased the vote rate by 3 points, and lost 25 seats. As we saw 
above, the rise of the opposition parties was due to the JSP’s “victory,” which was 
ascribed to a “boom of Takako Doi, (chairperson of the JSP),” brought about by the 
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party’s strong stand against a sales tax (Tanaka 1996: 330). Thus, in this case, we cannot 
decide whether slips of the tongue had an effect upon the vote rates and the numbers of 
winners of government and opposition parties. 
We will next compare the results of two national elections: the 40th on July 18, 
1993 and the 41st on October 20, 1996. Between the elections, Shin Sakurai, Ryutaro 
Hashimoto and Takami Eto made slips of the tongue. It is, however, difficult to make a 
precise comparison of the results obtained in the two national elections, because of two 
factors. First, the election system was changed. The 40th election was conducted under 
the multi-member constituency system, but the next one was in the parallel systems of 
single-member constituency and proportional representation. Secondly, Japanese 
political parties were actively and rapidly being reorganized during the time 10). For 
example, New Party Sakigake and Shinseito left the LDP just before the 40th election, 
and then Shinseito was reorganized as a new party, Shinshinto. 
As is shown in Table 5, the LDP obtained 36.6% in the 40th election under the 
multi-member constituency system, and 38.6% in the small electoral district, and 32.8% 
in proportional representation, in the 41st national election. The number of winners was 
223 in the 40th and 239 in the 41st (169 in the small electoral districts and 70 in the 
proportional representation district). The LDP raised its number of Diet seats. This 
means that the opposition parties did not make any great advance. Considering the 
factors mentioned above, it is safe to refrain from drawing a clear conclusion from this 
case about the effect of slips of the tongue. 
Judging from the two comparisons above, we cannot say definitively whether 
the slips of the tongue of the ministers influence the support expansion and the vote 
acquisition at the party level, either positively or negatively. But there is one case where 
slips of the tongue had an effect on the election result at the party level. It is the case of 
a series of the slips of the tongue of Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori. As we saw above, he 
made several verbal missteps. But he crowned his slips of the tongue with the statement 
that “I hope undecided voters will remain uninterested in the election and sleep through 
it” on June 20, 2000 just before the national election on June 25 (The Japan Times, June 
26, 2000). The opposition parties criticized this remark of his. The DPJ ran an 
advertisement in the newspapers to criticize Mori’s remark. This advertisement clearly 
shows that the opposition took advantage of Mori’s remark to try to achieve vote 
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acquisition and support expansion. Were these goals achieved?  
To see their effect, let us compare the results of the two elections: the 41st 
election on October 20, 1996 and the 42nd election on June 25, 2000. As is shown in 
Table 6, the LDP’s loss in the proportional representation system is clear both in the 
vote rates and in the number of seats, even if we consider the fact that in the 42nd 
election the total number of seats was reduced by 20. Their rate of vote was 28.1%, 
down by some 4.5% and the number of elected persons was 56, a decrease by 14 seats. 
The loss contrasts with the gain of the LDP in the single-member constituencies. The 
rate of vote of the LDP in the small electoral district rose a little from 38.63% to 
40.97%. The number of elected persons also increased from 169 to 177. In the 
proportional representation district, major opposition parties except the JCP raised their 
vote rates and the numbers of winners. The DPJ raised their vote rate from 16.1% to 
25.2% and their seats from 35 to 47. The SDP also raised the rate of vote from 6.4% to 
9.4% and the winners from 11 to 15. As far as the single-member constituencies are 
concerned, the slips of the tongue of Mori hardly worked for the change of the vote rate 
and the number of elected persons. But in the proportional representation, the LDP 
suffered a loss. The series of Mori’s speeches may have had a negative effect on the 
voters. For example, several ex-ministers of state and so-called important persons of the 
party were unsuccessful in this election. They regarded Mori’s verbal missteps as the 
cause of their defeats (Asahi Shimbun, June 29, 2000). The series of Mori’s slips of the 
tongue perhaps had an effect on the behavior of voters at least in the proportional 
representation district especially on the behavior of what Ikuo Kabashima calls 
“buffer-player” 11) and on the behavior of undecided voters. 
To sum up, we cannot say for sure from the examination of the election results 
whether slips of the tongue of the ministers have an effect on election behavior of voters 
toward political parties. It seems, however, that the apparent goals of opposition parties, 
support expansion and vote acquisition, are not achieved except in the proportional 
representation result in Mori’s case. The case of Prime Minister Mori’s verbal missteps 
should be treated as a special case, both because they were made by the prime minister, 
and not by an ordinary minister, and because they were made just before the election.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
The present paper tried to identify major political outcomes of slips of the tongue of the 
cabinet ministers. The political outcomes can be divided into two levels: personal level 
and governmental or party level.  
First, at the personal level, the ministers have to bear responsibility for their 
slips of the tongue, usually in one of the three ways: resignation, apology and 
explanation. The ministers who have resigned from the ministerial posts due to their 
slips of the tongue suffer in their future career in the following ways. But if the 
ministers escape resignation, the slips of the tongue have little impact for their future 
political career.  
(1) The ministers in question have never again been appointed to ministerial posts. 
(2) They have never been reappointed to an important Diet posts. 
(3) They have never been reappointed to important posts in the LDP. 
They have, however, never lost their positions as members of the Diet. Most of 
them were reelected after their slips of the tongue even though they resigned from the 
ministerial posts. Thus, slips of the tongue entail the responsibility as a minister but not 
as a member of the Diet. 
Second, the present paper ident ified three major political outcomes in the 
governmental/party level. They (1) cause a split in the diplomatic relations between 
Japan and the countries concerned, (2) destabilize the foundation of a coalition 
government, (3) become a means of attack against the government and government 
party or parties by the opposition. These three political outcomes can be found 
simultaneously in most cases of slips of the tongue of the ministers. As for the third 
outcome, we also examined whether support expansion and vote acquisition of the 
opposition worked or not as a result of the attack in terms of changes of the vote rates 
and the number of elected persons. But we could not reach any definitive conclusion on 
this point. 
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Notes 
 
1) For instance, Sengo Seijishi (Political History in the Post-war Japan) by Masumi Ishikawa 
and Sengo Nihon Seijishi (Political History in the Post-war Japan) by Hiroshi Tanaka 
mention the following verbal missteps of the ministers: Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida’s 
remark, “The idiot!” in 1953; “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” by Prime Minister Yasuhiro 
Nakasone in 1983; the statement in 1986 by Educational Minister Masayuki Fujio which 
defended Japan’s 1910 annexation of Korea; and Prime Minister Nakasone’s remark in 1986 
about discrimination against minority groups in the United States. 
2) The vast research literature on historical interpretation concerning Japan’s war responsibility 
are represented by Yutaka Yoshida Nihonjin no Sensokan (Japanese View of War) and 
Gendai Rekishigaku to Senso Sekinin (War Responsibility in the Study of Contemporary 
History), Tetsuya Takahashi Sengo Sekininron (Essays on Wa r Responsibility ), Keiichi 
Eguchi Nihon no Shinryaku to Nihonjin no Sensokan (Japan’s Aggression and Japanese 
View of War), Atsushi Koketsu Shinryaku Senso: Rekishi Jijitsu to Rekishi Ninshiki (An 
Aggressive War: Historical Reality and Historical Interpretation). 
3) Murata (1999: 207-209) discusses, from the viewpoint of diplomacy, cases where slips of the 
tongue of the ministers caused a split in the diplomatic relations between Japan and China, 
South Korea, or the United States. We may also include Arthy Iain’s Oeragata no 
Nihongojuku (Bigwigs’ Japanese Lesson), although it is regarded as a satirical novel. 
4) See Kawano & Matsuo (2000: 25-29). It provides a select list of literature dealing with 
language and politics. 
5) Miyagawa (ed.) No.12-No.37 
6) Jiji Press (ed.) (1999) and Seisaku Jiho Co. (ed) (1999). 
7) Their constituencies are not in urban areas but in rural areas and they have a strong basis of 
support from the voters. 
8) There were other examples though they did not cause resignation. In 1986, Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone made a discriminatory remark against minority groups in the United 
States (See Table 1). Though it was not the case of minister, Yoshio Sakurauchi, Speaker of 
the House of Representatives, said in 1992 that “U.S. managers cannot issue written orders 
because about 30 percent of American workers cannot read”. (The Japan Times, January 21, 
1992).   
9) Though he was not a minister, Koichi Hamada made a slip of the tongue during the time (See 
Table 1). 
10) See Kusano (1999) and Otake (1999) for the political situation. 
11) According to Kabashima, the Japanese buffer player is someone who is basically in favor of 
having the LDP run the government but wants the ruling and opposition parties to have fairly 
equal power (Kabashima 1998: 14). 
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Table 1 Cases of Slips of the Tongue and Their Outcomes  
Discussed in the Present Paper 
 
Yasuhiro NAKASONE, 1983/01/19, Prime Minister, Explanation 
 Details: The Washington Post reported Nakasone said Japan should be “like an unsinkable  
aircraft carrier” to defend against Soviet Backfire bombers and mentioned the need to 
control the “four straits” to block the passage of Soviet submarines in times of war. 
(The Japan Times, January 21, 1983) 
Responses: 
 Government party: Nakasone explained his remark. 
 Opposition parties: criticized Nakasone’s remark. 
 
Masayuki FUJIO, 1986/07/25･1986/09, Minister of Education, Resigned 
 Details: In a press conference, Fujio said “Has the fellows who complain (about historical 
textbook) never attacked against any countries?”(1986/07/25) In a monthly magazine 
interview, Fujio defended Japan’s 1910 annexation of Korea, the 1937 Nanjing 
Massacre, the Tokyo Tribunal on war criminals, and the Nakasone Cabinet ministers’ 
official visit to Yasukuni Shrine, dedicated to Japan’s war dead. The concrete contents 
are as follows. In the interview, Fujio said “there was no invasion by the Japanese 
Government and it was based on a mutual agreement between Japanese Prime Minister 
Hirobumi Ito and Go Jong, the Korean representative.” Referring to Japan’s military 
actions in China before and during World War II, he said that it was not the only 
country that had invaded other countries and that atrocities of war existed worldwide. 
He also expressed doubts about the Nanjing Massacre, in which thousands were said to 
have been killed by the Japanese Imperial Army during the war. He commented that 
there is no way to know exactly how many people were in fact killed in the incident. 
He referred to the Yasukuni Shrine issue, too. He said “Why did he (Prime Minister 
Nakasone) have to give up his official vis it to the shrine just because some outsiders 
complained about it?” As for the A-class Japanese war criminals enshrined there, he 
said that the blame should be put on the state. It is questionable to put the blame (of the 
war) on the war criminals who were executed, he said. He argued that the textbook and 
the Yasukuni Shrine issues stem from the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Furthermore, he 
insinuated that it was an unfair policy of the U.S. occupation. (The Japan Times, 
September 6-7, 1986. Daily Yomiuri, September 6, 1986) (1986/09) 
Content: Historical interpretation 
Responses: 
 Foreign countries: The South Korean and the Chinese Government made formal protests. 
 Government party: Prime Minister Nakasone and Foreign Minister Kuranari expressed 
their regrets. When Nakasone visited South Korea, he apologized for Fujio’s remark. 
 
Yasuhiro NAKASONE, 1986/09/22, Prime Minister, Explanation and Apology 
 Details: In a party seminar of the LDP, Nakasone made a remark about discrimination 
against minority groups in America. He said that Japan’s average of education is 
higher than America’s because of many minorities groups in America.   
Content: Discrimination against minorit ies in the U.S. 
Responses: 
 Foreign countries: A draft congressional resolution demanding an apology was laid in the  
U.S. House of Representatives. 
 Government party: Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda explained Nakasone’s remark and later  
Nakasone sent a message for apology to the U.S. 
 Opposition parties: criticized Nakasone’s remark. 
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Koichi HAMADA, 1988/02/06,  
Chairman of the Committee on Budget of the House of Representatives 
Details: Hamada called Kenji Miyamoto, supreme boss of the Japanese Communist Party, a 
“murderer” during a committee debate session. (The Japan Times, February 7, 1988) 
Content: Slanderous remarks on a specified person 
Responses: 
 Foreign countries: None. 
Government party: Committee head director Okuda expressed regret. 
 Opposition parties: The JCP demanded Hamada’s dismissal and other opposition parties 
criticized Hamada. 
 
Seisuke OKUNO, 1988/04/22, Director General of National Land Agency, Resigned 
Details: In a press conference, Okuno justified Japan’s military actions against Asian 
countries during World War II. He said that “Japan fought the war in order to secure its 
safety” and that “Asia was colonized by Caucasians at that time. Japan was by no 
means a nation of aggression.” He also expressed regret that Japanese people had been 
“twisted around” by the remarks of China’s top leader Deng Xiaoping. (The Japan 
Times, April 23, 1988) 
Content: Criticism of Deng Xiaoping and historical interpretation 
Responses 
 Foreign countries: The South Korean and the Chinese Governments made formal protests. 
 Government party: Prime Minister Takeshita and Foreign Minister Uno expressed their 
regrets. 
 Opposition parties: Major opposition parties demanded Okuno’s resignation and criticized 
the Takeshita cabinet. 
 
Seiroku KAJIYAMA, 1990/09/21, Minister of Justice, Apology 
Details: Kajiyama made a remark concerning discrimination against black Americans. He 
said “ it’s like in America when neighborhoods become mixed because blacks move in, 
and whites are forced out.” He made the remark to explain to reporters his impressions 
after observing a police crackdown on foreign women allegedly solicit ing customers on 
Tokyo’s streets for sex. (The Japan Times, September 23, 1990) 
Content: Discrimination against minorit ies in the U.S. 
Responses: 
 Foreign countries: The U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee passed 
by voice vote a resolution demanding Justice Minister Seiroku Kajiyama be 
reprimanded for his remark. 
 Government party: Prime Minister Kaifu expressed his regret. 
 Opposition parties: The JSP demanded the political responsibility of the Kaifu Cabinet. 
 
Keisuke NAKANISHI, 1993/11/18-1993/12/01, Director General of the Defense Agency, 
Resigned 
Details: Nakanishi referred to the necessity to discuss amendments to Article 9 of the 
Constitution. He made the remark to urge the adoption of Japan’s U.N. Peacekeeping 
Cooperation Law. Some of his remarks are as follows: “it cannot be said that the 
Peacekeeping Cooperation Law is perfect,” “it has aspects in which what is common 
sense for Japan is not so for the rest of the world,” and “at a time when the world is 
changing rapidly, it is no good to stick to the war-renouncing Constitution, which was 
drafted half of a century ago,” and so forth. These remarks were made in a committee 
of the Diet, a press conference, and a study meeting of his party. (Yomiuri Shimbun, 
December 2/3, 1993. The Japan Times, December 3, 1993) 
Content: Remark casting doubt upon the necessity of Article 9. 
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Responses: 
 Foreign countries: None. 
 Government party: The JSP demanded for Nakanishi’s removal. 
 Opposition parties: The LDP and the JCP requested Nakanishi’s resigning. 
Shigeto NAGANO, 1994/05/04, Minister of Justice, Resigned  
Details: In a Mainichi Shimbun Interview, Nagano denied the 1937 Nanjing Massacre 
happened and said it is wrong to say Japan’s invasion of neighboring Asian states 
before and during World War II was an act of aggression. Main remarks are as follows; 
“I believe the Nanjing Massacre is a fabrication. I went to Nanjing directly afterward,” 
and “It’s wrong to say the Pacific War was waged with the aim of aggression. They 
were serious about liberating the colonies, liberating the Greater East Asian 
Co-Prosperity Sphere.” (Mainichi Shimbun, May 5, 1994/ The Japan Times, May 5, 
1994.) 
Content: Historical interpretation 
Responses: 
 Foreign countries: The South Korean and the Chinese Government made formal protests. 
 Government party: Prime Minister Hata and Komeito criticized Nagano’s remark. 
 Opposition parties: Major opposition parties showed a pose to force the Prime Minister to 
dissolve the Diet and call a general election. The JSP and the JCP called for Nagano’s 
removal. The LDP demande the political responsibility of Hata as Prime Minister. 
 
Shin SAKURAI, 1994/08/12, Director General of the Environment, Resigned  
Details: In a press conference, Sakurauchi made a remark that Japan had no intention of 
waging a war of aggression in the 1930s and 1940s. He also said that as a result of the 
war, Asian countries became independent, education is now widespread and literacy 
rates are high. (The Japan Times, August 13, 1994) 
Content: Historical interpretation 
Responses:  
 Foreign countries: The South Korean and the Chinese Government made formal protests. 
 Government party: Prime Minister Murayama expressed his regret. Some important 
members of the JSP voiced strong demands for Sakurai’s resignation. 
 Opposition parties: The JCP demanded Sakurai’s resignation. Other opposition parties 
demanded that the Murayama Cabinet should bear political responsibility.  
 
Ryutaro HASHIMOTO, 1994/10/24, Minister of International Trade and Industry, 
Explanation 
Details : Hashimoto said in a Diet session that Japan tried to fight the United States and 
Britain, not Asian countries, and thus it is a matter of subtle definition as to whether 
Japan waged wars of invasion against Asian nations in the past. He said "Japan took 
action against the Korean Peninsula that could be denounced as colonialism and I have 
said that there had been acts of aggression against China.” But he also said that doubts 
remain whether Japan’s war against the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands should be 
defined as a war of aggression. He added that he felt sorry for the people in the 
Asian-Pacific region where Japan fought the war. (The Japan Times, October 26, 1994) 
Content: Historical interpretation 
Responses:  
 Foreign countries: The Chinese Government criticized Hashimato’s remark and the South 
Korean Government made a formal protest. But later the South Korean Government 
accepted the explanation of the Japanese Government.   
 Government party: The Government parties defended Hashimato’s remark but Wataru 
Kubo, secretary general of the JSP criticized his remark. 
 Opposition parties: The JCP demanded Hashimoto’s resignation. 
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Takami ETO, 1995/11/09,  
Director General of the Management and Coordination Agency, Resigned 
Details: Eto told Japanese reporters in an off-the-record meeting that the 1910-1945 period 
of the Japanese colonial rule over the peninsula had some positive impacts, such as 
construction of schools, railroads and ports. He also said that not every Korean was 
required to adopt a Japanese name. The South Korean newspaper, Dong-A Ilbo carried 
an article on Eto’s remarks. (The Japan Times, November 9/10, 1995) 
Content: Historical interpretation 
Responses:  
 Foreign countries: The South Korean Government made a formal protest. 
 Government party: The JSP showed displeasure at Eto’s remark and Sakigake criticized it. 
The LDP did not accept Eto’s resignation. 
 
Shingo NISHIMURA, 1999/10, Parliamentary Vice Minister of the Defense Agency, 
Resigned 
Details: In the Japanese weekly magazine Playboy, he commented that “the Diet should 
consider the fact Japan may be better off if it armed itself with nuclear weapons.”  
(The Japan Times, October 20, 1999) 
Content: Comment on the nuclear armament of Japan 
Responses:   
 Foreign countries: The South Korean and the Chinese Government made formal protests. 
 Government party: The Government parties agreed to the resignation at once. 
 Opposition parties: Opposition parties demanded the political responsibility of Obuchi who 
appointed Nishimura and tried to move a vote of nonconfidence in the Cabinet. 
 
Michio OCHI, 2000/02/19,  
Chairperson (Minister of State) of the Financial Reconstruction Commission, Resigned  
Details: During a meeting in Shiobara, Tochigi Prefecture, that was organized by his LDP 
colleague, Susumu Hasumi, who represents the prefecture, and brought together 40 
executives from local financial institutions, Ochi was saying that “Please inform us of 
any complaints about the inspection, if it’s severe ... I will give it the utmost 
consideration if you make a written request to Mr. Hasumi and he passes it to me.” (The 
Japan Times, February 24, 2000) 
Content: Remark of “making allowance for the inspection” 
Responses:  
 Foreign countries: None 
 Government party: The Government parties confirmed Ochi’s removal. 
 Opposition parties: Opposition parties stopped the session of a Diet committee and 
required Ochi’s removal. 
 
Yoshiro MORI, 2000/05/15, Prime Minister, Explanation and Apology  
Details: Mori said in a gathering of lawmakers belonging to Shinto Seiji Renmei, a political 
group of the Association of Shinto Shrines, that “we (have made efforts to) make the 
public realize that Japan is a divine nation centering on the Emperor. It's been 30 years 
since we started our activities based on this thought.” (The Japan Times, May 17, 2000) 
He was an adviser of the association. 
Content: Remark of “divine nation centering on the Emperor” 
Responses:  
 Foreign countries: The Chinese Government showed displeasure at Mori’s remark.  
 Government party: New Komeito showed displeasure at Mori’s remark. 
 Opposition parties: Four major parties agreed to form a united front in a bid to jointly force 
Mori out of office over his remark. (The Japan Times, May 18, 2000) 
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Yoshiro MORI, 2000/06/03, Prime Minister, Explanation 
Details: During a lecture in Nara, he said “The Japanese Communist Party says it will not 
change its principles. It does not recognize the Imperial system.” “The party calls for 
dissolving the Self-Defense Forces and does not approve of the Japan-U.S. security 
arrangement.” “How could we possibly secure Japan’s kokutai (polity) and ensure 
public safety with such a party.” (The Japan Times, June 5, 2000) 
Content: Using the term of “kokutai” 
Responses:  
 Foreign countries: The Chinese Government showed displeasure at Mori’s remark.   
 Government party: The LDP and New Komeito defended Mori’s remark. 
 
Yoshiro MORI, 2000/06/20, Prime Minister, 
Details: In Niigata, Mori said that “I hope undecided voters will remain uninterested in the 
election and sleep through it.” (The Japan Times, June 26, 2000) 
Content: 
Responses:  
 Foreign countries: None 
 Opposition parties: Opposition parties criticized Mori’s remark. 
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Table 2 Career of the Ministers Who Resigned after Their Slips of the Tongue (1) 
 
year/month/
day 
Speaker and Status 
(at the time) 
Career 
1986/07-09 Masayuki FUJIO 
Minister of Education 
Chairman of Research Commission on Oil, 
Resources and Energy of the LDP, Chairman of 
Committee on the Kinki District of Japan of the 
LDP 
1988/04-05 Seisuke OKUNO,  
Director General of National 
Land Agency 
Chairman of Research Commission on Public 
Administration and Finance of the LDP, 
Chairman of Liaison Committee on Education 
of the LDP, Chairman of Deliberative Council 
on Political Ethics of the House of 
Representatives  
1993/11 Keisuke NAKANISHI 
Director General of the 
Defense Agency  
Chairman of Election Campaign Committee of 
the LP, Chairman of Land and Construction 
Policy Research Council of the LP, Chairman of 
Okinawa and Hokkaido Policy Research 
Council of the LP  
1994/05/04 Shigeto NAGANO (2) 
Minister of Justice 
None 
1994/08/12 Shin SAKURAI 
Director General of the 
Environment 
 
Chairman of Special Committee on Political 
Ehics and Election Law, Chairman of Research 
Commission on the Promotion of Electric 
Power Plant Production of the LDP 
1995/11/09 Takami ETO, Director 
General of the Management 
and Coordination Agency 
Chairman of Committee on the Development of 
the Chugoku Region of the LDP, Chairman of 
Special Committee on Water Resources 
Development, Leader of a major faction of the 
LDP (the group name is Eto-Kamei faction) 
1999/10 Shingo NISHIMURA 
Parliamentary Vice Minister 
of the Defense Agency 
Chairman of Standing Committee on Discipline 
of the House of Representatives, Chairman of 
Law Policy Research Council of the LP 
2000/02/19 Michio OCHI 
Chairperson of the Financial 
Reconstruction Commission 
None 
 
(1) Official English translations of committees or commissions here follow those provided by 
the websites of the LDP (http://www.jimin.jp/) (March 2, 2002), by Foreign Affairs Division, 
International Affairs Department, Secretariat House of Representatives and by International 
Affaires Committee, Liberal Party.  
(2) He stood as a candidate only once.  
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Table 3 Relative Rates of Votes of the Ministers Concerned 
 
Vote rates (%) 
and the election date 
 
 
Year/Month 
/Day 
 
 
Speaker and Status (at the time of 
the slip of the tongue) 
  before slip of 
the tongue 
 
after slip of the 
tongue 
Change of 
placing 
among 
winners, 
(S):won 
(D): lost 
 
Electoral district 
(number of seats, 
“S” for the 
single-member 
constituency) 
1983/01/19 Yasuhiro NAKASONE 
Prime Minister 
23.8 
(1980/6/22) 
30.1 
(1983/12/18) 
2→2 (S) Gunma 3 (4) 
1986/07-09 Masayuki FUJIO 
Minister of Education 
18.6 
(1986/7/6) 
15.8 
(1990/2/18) 
1→2 (S) Tochigi 2 (5) 
1988/04-05 Seisuke OKUNO, Director General 
of National Land Agency 
19.2 
(1986/7/6) 
14.6 
(1990/2/18) 
1→3 (S) All Nara (5) 
1990/09/21 Seiroku KAJIYAMA  
Minister of Justice 
34.1 
(1990/2/18) 
31.2 
(1993/7/18) 
2→1 (S) Ibaragi 2 (3) 
1993/11 Keisuke NAKANISHI 
Director General of the Defense 
Agency  
26.4 
(1993/7/18) 
35.1(1) 
(1996/10/20) 
3→1 (S) Wakayama 1 (3) 
Wakayama 1 (S) 
1994/05/04 Shigeto NAGANO (2) 
Minister of Justice  
    
1994/08/12 Shin SAKURAI 
Director General of the 
Environment 
14.1 
(1993/7/18) 
40.8 
(1996/10/20) 
3→1 (S) Niigata 3 (5) 
Niigata 2 (S) 
1994/10/24 Ryutaro HASHIMOTO 
Minister of International Trade and 
Industry  
28.4 
(1993/7/18) 
68.0 
(1996/10/20) 
1→1 (S) Okayama 2 (5) 
Okayama 4 (S) 
1995/11/09 Takami ETO, Director General of 
the Management and Coordination 
Agency 
35.1 
(1993/7/18) 
55.5 
(1996/10/20) 
1→1 (S) Miyazaki 1 (3) 
Miyazaki 2 (S) 
1999/10 Shingo NISHIMURA  
Parliamentary Vice Minister of the 
Defense Agency 
42.7 
(1996/10/20) 
15.9(3) 
(2000/6/25) 
1→4 (D) Osaka 17 (S) 
2000/02/19 Michio OCHI, Chairperson 
(Minister of State) of the Financial 
Reconstruction Commission  
26.2(6) 
(1996/10/20) 
22.2 
(2000/6/25) 
2→2 (D) Tokyo 6 (S) 
2000/05/15･ 
06/04･06/20 
Yoshiro MORI  
Prime Minister  
51.7 
(1996/10/20) 
64.4 
(2000/6/25) 
1→1 (S) Ishikawa 2 (S) 
 
Source: Adapted from Miyagawa (ed.) No.12-No.37 
Notes 
(1) The single-member constituency system was introduced from the 41st general election on 
October 20, 1996. The numbers indicate the rates of votes in the single-member constituency 
after the 41st.  
(2) He ran for proportional representation of the House of Councilors only once. 
(3) He lost the election of the single -member constituency, but was elected in the proportional 
representation district. 
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Table 4 The Results of the 38th and 39th Elections of the House of Representatives 
 
The figures are vote rates and the number of winners 
The number of nonpartisan winners is not included. 
――― indicates that the party in question did not run for the election 
 
 The 38th election 
(1986/07/06) 
second Nakasone Cabinet 
The 39th election 
(1990/02/18) 
first Kaifu Cabinet 
government party total  51.3 306 46.1 275 
Liberal Democratic Party 49.4 300 46.1 275 
New Liberal Club 1.8 6 ――― ―― 
opposition parties total 45.1 197 46.0 215 
Japan Socialist Party 17.2 85 24.4 136 
Komeito 9.4 56 8.0 45 
Japanese Communist Party 8.8 26 8.0 16 
Democratic Socialist Party 8.8 26 4.8 14 
Social Democratic Federation 0.8 4 0.9 4 
Source: Adapted from Miyagawa (1993), No.28, p210 
 
 
 
Table 5 The Results of the 40th and 41st Elections of the House of Representatives 
 
The figures show vote rates (upper line) and the number of winners 
The number of nonpartisan winners is not included. 
――― indicates that the party in question did not run for the election 
 
41st election (1996/10/20)  40th  
election 
(1993/07/18) 
single-member 
constituency 
proportional 
representation 
total of 
winners 
government parties total  36.6 223 42.1 175 40.16 81 256 
Liberal Democratic Party 36.6 223 38.6 169 32.8 70 239 
Social Democratic  Party(1)   2.1 4 6.4 11 15 
Sakigake   1.3 2 1.1 0 2 
opposition parties total 56.3 274 51.1 115 57.2 119 234 
Shinshinto ―― ―― 28.0 96 28.0 60 156 
Shinseito 10.1 55 ―― ―― ―― ―― ――― 
Democratic Party of Japan ― ―― 10.6 17 16.1 35 52 
Japan Socialist Party 15.4 70      
Komeito 8.1 51 ―― ―― ―― ―― ――― 
Japan New Party 8.1 51 ―― ―― ―― ―― ――― 
Japanese Communist Party 7.7 15 12.6 2 13.1 24 26 
Democratic Socialist Party 3.5 15 ―― ―― ―― ―― ――― 
SDF(2) 0.7 4 ―― ―― ―― ―― ――― 
Sakigake 2.6 13      
Source: Adapted from Miyagawa (1999), No.35, p234 
(1) Formerly, Japan Socialist Party), (2) Social Democratic Federation 
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Table 6 The Result in the Proportional Representation of the 41st and 42nd 
Elections of the House of Representatives 
 
The figures show vote rates and the number of winners 
――― indicates that the party in question did not run for the election 
In the 42nd election, the total number of seats was reduced by 20 seats. 
 
 41st election 
(1996/10/20) 
42nd election 
(2000/6/25) 
government party total  40.2 81 41.69 80 
Liberal Democratic Party 32.8 70 28.3 56 
Komeito ――― ――― 13.0 24 
New Conservative Party ――― ――― 0.4 0 
SDP 6.4 11 ――― ――― 
Sakigake 1.1 0 ――― ――― 
oppos ition parties total 57.2 119 568 100 
Shinshinto 28.0 60  ――― 
Liberal Party ――― ――― 11.0 18 
Democratic Party of Japan 16.1 35 25.2 47 
Japanese Communist Party 13.1 24 11.2 20 
Social Democratic  Party(1) ――― ――― 9.4 15 
Source: Adapted from Miyagawa (2000), No.37, p206 
(1) Formerly, Japan Socialist Party 
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